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JURISDICTION STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2-2 and § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the district court err in refusing to set aside the default judgment where

Arbogast failed to notify River Crossings of the initiation of default proceedings against
it? This issue presents a question of law, which the Court reviews for correctness,
according no deference to the district court. Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75 ffl| 8, 12, 11
P.3d277.
2.

Did the district court abuse its limited discretion in refusing to set aside the

default judgment where River Crossings' Rule 60(b) motion demonstrated reasonable
justification for failing to respond, was timely, and presented meritorious defenses? This
issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion; however, that "discretion is not unlimited."
Lund v.Brown, 2000 UT 75 ^ 8-11, 11 P.3d 277.
3.

Did the district court abuse its limited discretion in refusing to set aside the

default judgment based on faulty findings of fact? This Court will reverse findings of
fact that the marshaled evidence demonstrates are clearly erroneous.
Consolidation Co. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT App 434, U 14, 105 P.3d 365, 370.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
See Addendum
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case,

This is an appeal from the district court's improper refusal to set aside the default
judgment entered against River Crossings, despite the fact that River Crossings was given
no notice of the default proceedings and despite the fact that River Crossings presented
reasonable excuses for its failure to answer Arbogast's complaint.

While actively

engaged in settlement negotiations, Arbogast quietly obtained a default judgment against
River Crossings after having admittedly promised River Crossings that it would not do so
without prior notice to River Crossings.

Relying on these representations, River

Crossings held off on filing a responsive pleading while continuing to attempt settlement.
The district court abused its limited discretion in refusing to accept River Crossings
reasonable excuses as grounds for setting aside the default judgment.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

On January 10, 2006, Arbogast filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (Civil
No. 06050096) in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, State of Utah.
(R. at 1.) Since the filing of the underlying Complaint, regarding the above-identified
disputes, counsel for Arbogast was in contact with River Crossings' Nevada counsel, the
law firm of Black Lobello & Sparks. (R. at 58.)
During the ongoing settlement negotiations process, Arbogast granted River
Crossings several extensions for its responsive pleading. (R. at 88-89.) On or around
June 16, 2006, Mr. Utley, counsel for Arbogast, expressly stated to River Crossings'
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Nevada counsel that he would not file for Default Judgment without first notifying them
of Arbogast's intent to do so. (R. at 595 96.)
On or around July 31, 2006, Arbogast presented the district court with a Default
Certificate, without serving a copy on River Crossings. (R. at 32.) On August 11, 2006,
Arbogast filed a Default Judgment against River Crossings, without serving a copy on
River Crossings. (R. at 35.) Contrary to his assurances made on June 16, 2006, Mr.
Utley did not notify River Crossings' counsel before filing the Default Certificate or the
Default Judgment. (R. at 59.) River Crossings was first notified of the underlying
Default Judgment when River Crossings' Nevada counsel received a copy of the Notice
of Entry of Default Judgment on August 17, 2006. (R. at 59.)
On September 26, 2006, River Crossings filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment
and Orders. (R. at 45.) A hearing was held before the Honorable Eric A. Ludlow on
February 21, 2007.

(R. at 185.)

The district court issued its Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Relief on April 18,
2007. (R. at 115.)
C.

Statement of Relevant Facts.

1.

On or around September 16, 2004, Arbogast provided River Crossings with

a loan in the amount of Two Million Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars
($2,450,000.00) (hereinafter "Loan"). (R. at 116 H 1.)
2.

The Loan was secured by a Trust Deed Note dated September 16, 2004.

(R. at 1161f2.)
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3.

The signed Trust Deed Note provided the following schedule of payments:

On October 165 2004, the, sum of $18,375.00 was due. Thereafter, the like sum was due
on the 16th day of each month until the 16th of September, 2005, when the remaining
unpaid balance, together with accrued interest, was due and payable. (R. at 116 Tf 4.)
4.

The subject Trust Deed Note also included the following terms regarding a

penalty for late payments (hereinafter "Late Payment Penalty"): "A late payment penalty
of Six percent (6.0%) of any payment due shall be assessed against the Maker if said
payment has not been received by Holder within five (5) days of the due date." (R. at
11718.)
5.

There is a dispute as to whether, sometime before September 16, 2005,

Arbogast granted River Crossings an extension for the due date of the final payment. (R.
at 58, 116 H 9.) River Crossings alleges that the final payment for the Trust Deed Note
was in fact timely, as Arbogast had granted an extension to River Crossings. (R. at 58.)
Arbogast alleges that it did not grant an extension.
6.

On October 7, 2005, twenty-one (21) days after September 16, 2005, River

Crossings made the final payment. (R. at 116 U 7.)
7.

Thereafter, Arbogast asserted a Late Payment Penalty against River

Crossings in the amount of One Hundred Forty Eight Thousand One Hundred SeventySix Dollars ($148,176.00) plus accruing interest thereon at the rate of Twelve percent
(12%) per annum from the date of October 7, 2005 to the present. (R. at 3, 117 ^ 10.)
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8.

Since October 7, 2005, there has been a dispute between Arbogast and

River Crossings regarding, without limitation, the due date of the final payment and the
enforceability and interpretation of the Late Payment Penalty. (R. at 58, 117 ^| 12.)
9.

Since the inception of the above-identified disputes, the parties have

participated in several settlement negotiations. (R. at 58.)
10.

On or around October 26, 2005, Arbogast retained Attorney Chad Utley to

represent it for the above identified disputes. (R. at 58.)
11.

On or around January 10, 2006, Arbogast filed a Complaint for Declaratory

Judgment (Civil No. 06050096) in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County,
State of Utah. (R. at 1.)
12.

On or about December 20, 2005, Mr. Utley received a letter from the

Nevada firm of Black Lobello & Sparks ("BLS"), informing him that River Crossings
had retained its legal services. (R. at 118 ^f 13.)
13.

From the filing of the underlying Complaint, Mr. Utley was in contact with

counsel at BLS. (R. at 58.)
14.

Mr. Utley granted BLS attorney, Aileen E. Cohen, at least two extensions

of time in which to respond to the Complaint, to make a settlement offer and/or to seek
Utah counsel. (R. at 88-89.) Until the discharge of her employment at BLS, which
occurred on or around June 30, 2006, Ms. Cohen was in charge of the communications
and settlement negotiations with Arbogast's counsel. (R. at 59 ]fl| 14-15.)
15.

The second extension given to Ms. Cohen expired on or about June 14,

2006. (R. at 89, 118 U 16.)
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16.

Sometime between June 14, 2006 and June 29. 2006, Mr. Utley had contact

with BLS attorneys, Tisha Black-Chernine and Josh Corelli. (R. at 119 f 18.)
17.

On or around June 16, 2006, Mr. Utley expressly stated to Ms. Black -

Chernine and Mr. Corelli that he would not pursue default judgment against River
Crossings without first notifying them of Arbogast's intent to file for default. (R. at 59,
96.) Mr. Utley has not disputed that he made this representation.
18.

On or about June 28, 2006, Mr. Corelli communicated a settlement offer to

Mr. Utley via telephone on behalf of River Crossings. (R. at 119 ^ 19.)
19.

On or about June 29, 2006, Mr. Utley sent a letter to Ms. Black-Chernine

and Mr. Corelli, rejecting River Crossings' June 28 settlement offer ("June 29 Letter").
(R.at91, 119^20.)
20.

The June 29 Letter also stated as follows: "My client has previously granted

your client an extension of time within which to answer the complaint. However, given
the present state of the case, I am, on behalf of my client, hereby requesting that your
client file an Answer to the complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter."
(R.at91.)
21.

At the time of the June 29 Letter, Ms. Black-Chernine was on extended

vacation and was not made aware of the June 29 Letter. (R. at 96.)
22.

On June 30, Ms. Cohen, the BLS attorney who had been responsible for the

communications and settlement negotiations with Arbogast's counsel, was discharged.
Ms. Cohen's discharge caused matters regarding the subject matter to not be immediately
addressed. (R. at 59fflj14-15.)
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23.

Interpreting Mr. Utley's June 29 Letter within the context of his prior oral

representations and ongoing settlement negotiations, BLS understood that Mr. Utley was
merely requesting that River Crossings file its answer within twenty days but would not
pursue default judgment without first notifying BLS. (R. at 96-97.)
24.

Counsel for the parties had no discussions with one another between June

29 and August 18, 2006. (R. at 7 H 23.)
25.

River Crossings' counsel further understood that Utah law, like Nevada

law, required Arbogast to serve them with any default papers filed with the court. (R. at
53-54.)
26.

However, on or around July 25, 2006, Mike Chernine, Managing Member

of River Crossings, sent an email to Arbogast, requesting another settlement negotiation
conference to discuss the above-identified dispute. (R. at 59, 102.) Arbogast does not
dispute this.
27.

Arbogast never responded to River Crossings request for a settlement

conference. (R. at 97.)
28.

Instead, just six days later, Arbogast presented the district court with a

Certificate of Default, in which it falsely represented to the court that River Crossings
had not appeared in the case. (R. at 32.)
29.

On August 11, 2006, Arbogast requested Default Judgment against River

Crossings. (R. at 35.)
30.

On August 17, 2006, Notice of Entry of Default Judgment was filed with

the Court and was sent by Arbogast to River Crossings. (R. at 37.)
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31.

River Crossings was first notified of the underlying Default Judgment when

River Crossings' Nevada counsel received a copy of the Notice of Entry of Default
Judgment on August 17, 2006. (R. at 59.)
32.

It was the understanding of River Crossings' Nevada counsel that the

parties were continuing settlement negotiations between June 16, 2006 and August 11,
2006. (R. at 59.)
33.

Contrary to his assurances made on June 16, 2006, and contrary to Utah

law, Mr. Utley did not notify River Crossings' counsel of his intent to request a default
against River Crossings. (R. at 59.)
34.

River

Crossings'

counsel's

notification

and

communications

with

Arbogast's counsel constitute an appearance. (R. at 120.)
35.

Nevertheless, Arbogast did not serve River Crossings with a copy of the

Certificate of Default or the request for entry of Default Judgment, as required by URCP
Rule 5(a)(2). (R. at 35, 37.)
36.

On September 26, 2006, River Crossings filed a Motion for Relief from

Judgment and Orders. (R. at 45.)
37.

The district court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

Order Denying Defendant's Motion on April 18, 2007. (R. at 115.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
River Crossings is entitled to reversal of the district court's refusal to set aside the
default judgment improperly entered against it. Because Arbogast never served River
Crossings with the default documents it filed with the district court—and because River
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Crossings had no notice whatsoever of the initiation of default proceedings by
Arbogast—the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter default against River Crossings.
Furthermore, given Arbogast's failure to serve River Crossings with the default
documents, and River Crossings justifiable reliance on Arbogast's representations that it
would not seek a default without first notifying River Crossings, the district court abused
its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
ARGUMENT
The district court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in refusing to
set aside the default judgment against River Crossings pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; . . . (4) the judgment is void; . . . or (6) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis added). Because River Crossings mistakenly believed
that Arbogast would not seek to obtain a default judgment against it without notice, and
because Arbogast provided no notice of the default judgment proceedings, the district
court should have set aside the default judgment under Rule 60(b)

611 367470v3
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I.

THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS VOID FOR LACK OF NOTICE TO
RIVER CROSSINGS.
A.

Standard of Review.

The district court erred as a matter of law in refusing to set aside the default
judgment entered against River Crossings because River Crossings had no notice of the
initiation of default proceedings against it and had no opportunity to respond.
We ordinarily explain [the fact that a default judgment is void
if the defendant received no notice of the time for answering]
by stating that because the defendant failed to receive proper
notice the court did not have jurisdiction. It is more accurate
to say that because of the lack of the notice to the defendant
the court did not have jurisdiction to enter a default judgment.
Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879, 881 n.2 (Utah 1981) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
When a motion to vacate a judgment is based on a claim of
lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if
jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without
denying due process to the one against whom it runs.
State v. Vijil 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added).

Because River

Crossings had no notice of the initiation of default proceedings against it, the default
judgment is void and the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter default judgment
against River Crossings.
B.

River Crossings Was Entitled to Notice of the Default Proceedings.

Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "expresses the general principle
that notice of all proceedings must be provided to all parties." Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT
75 H 22, 11 P.3d 277 (emphasis added).

611 367470v3

10

Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise
directed by the court, . . . every written motion other than one
heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand,
offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon
each of the parties.
Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1).
Although subsection 5(a)(2) excepts "parties in default" from the general notice
rule, River Crossings was not in default when Arbogast filed its Certificate of Default
with the district court.

A simple failure to file a responsive pleading does not

automatically place a party in default. A party is not in default until the clerk of the court
has signed the default certificate. Utah R. Civ. P. 55. Because River Crossings was not
in default at the time Arbogast submitted the Certificate of Default with the court for
signing, Arbogast was required to provide—and River Crossings was entitled to
receive—notice of Arbogast's filing of the Certificate of Default with the court pursuant
to Rule 5(a).
Even if River Crossings could have been considered in default prior to the signing
of the Certificate of Default by the court, it was nevertheless entitled to service of both
the Certificate of Default and the request for entry of Default Judgment pursuant to Rule
5(a)(2)(B). That rule provides that "a party in default for any reason other than for failure
to appear shall be served with all pleadings and papers." Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2)(B)
(emphasis added.) In its Findings of Fact, the district court expressly held that although
River Crossing's counsel had not formally appeared, "Defendant's counsel's notification
and communications with Plaintiffs counsel constitute an appearance." (R. at 120 ^ 29.)
(emphasis added). River Crossings was therefore entitled to service of all pleadings and
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papers in the case, including notice of Arbogast's filing of the Certificate of Default and
the request for Default Judgment.
This conclusion is mandated by Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, a Utah Supreme
Court decision that is highly pertinent to this case. The defendants in Lund failed to file
an answer to a counterclaim based on their mistaken belief that the proceedings had been
stayed. Without providing notice to the defendants, opposing counsel sought a default
judgment against them—as happened in this case. IdL ^[j 5. The trial court entered defaults
against the defendants and then entered default judgment against them. As in the present
case, the only notice of the default proceedings given by opposing counsel was a copy of
the entry of default judgment. Id.
The Lund defendants then filed a motion to set aside the default judgment under
Rule 60(b) on the grounds that they received no notice of the default proceedings and
were mistaken as to the need to file a responsive pleading. Id^ ^| 14. The district court
denied the motion. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the defendants were
entitled to notice of the default proceedings under Rule 5(a) and that the failure of
opposing counsel to provide notice mandated reversal of the district court and setting
aside the default judgment. Id. at ^ 20.
River Crossings is likewise entitled to reversal of the district court's ruling on its
motion to set aside the default judgment.

As with the defendants in Lund, River

Crossings received no notice from Arbogast of the initiation of default proceedings
against it, was not served with the default requests, and had no opportunity to respond to
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the default proceedings. River Crossings first learned of the default judgment when
Arbogast served it with a notice of entry of default judgment.1
Although the district court tacitly acknowledged in its Findings and Conclusions
that River Crossings was entitled to notice of the default proceedings, it wrongly
concluded that Mr. Utley's June 29 Letter to counsel for River Crossings constituted
sufficient notice. (R. at 120 ^ 29.) In reality, that letter made no mention whatsoever of
Arbogast's intention to seek default if River Crossings' failed to answer within the time
requested. Neither did the letter satisfy the demands of Rule 5(a)(2) that Arbogast serve
River Crossings with a copy of the Certificate of Default submitted to the district court
for signature and the request for entry of default. (R. at 91.)
As is plain on its face, the June 29 Letter merely constituted a "request" to River
Crossings to file a responsive pleading within the timeframe provided. IdL At best, the
letter simply set a deadline for River Crossings to file a responsive pleading—and in that
regard was effectively akin to Rule 12(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
requires a defendant to file a responsive pleading to a complaint within 20 days. The
June 29 Letter is no more notice of default than is Rule 12(a). If mere notice of a
deadline to respond also necessarily constitutes notice of default proceedings in
satisfaction of Rule 5(a)(2), then notice of default would be automatically imputed to

1

By failing to serve or otherwise notify River Crossings of the initiation of default
proceedings against it Mr. Utley also violated the Utah Standards of Professionalism and
Civility, Rule 14-301(16), Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, which
states: "Lawyers shall not cause the entry of a default without first notifying other
counsel whose identity is known, unless their clients' legitimate rights could be adversely
affected." (emphasis added).
611 367470v3
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every defendant who failed to file an answer within the time set forth in Rule 12(a). Such
an interpretation would render Rule 5(a)(2) absolutely meaningless and superfluous.
This Court cannot adopt such a reading, first, because it cannot be harmonized
with the Supreme Court's decision in Lund and, second, because of the "well-established
principle of statutory construction requiring [the Court] to give meaning, where possible
to all provisions of a statute."

Lund at ^ 23 (internal citations omitted).

"Any

interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to be
avoided." Id. (internal citations omitted). Rule 5(a)(2) requires on its face that defaulting
parties receive specific notice of the initiation of default proceedings through service of
default filings, not merely notice of deadlines for filing responsive pleadings to a
complaint.
Because Arbogast failed to serve or otherwise notify River Crossings of the
initiation of default proceedings against it, the resulting default judgment is void. The
district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to enter default judgment against River
Crossings, and the judgment cannot stand. The district court erred as a matter of law in
refusing to set aside the default judgment under Rule 60(b).
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
SET AISDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WHERE RIVER CROSSINGS
PRESENTED A "REASONABLE EXCUSE" FOR FAILING TO FILE A
RESPONSIVE PLEADING.
A.

Standard of Review.

Although the decision to set aside a default judgment is within the discretion of the
district court, uthe court's discretion is not unlimited." Lund at U 10. The "nature of a
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default judgment and the equitable nature of rule 60" provide meaningful limits on the
district court's discretion. Id..
While a district judge has discretion to grant or deny a 60(b)
motion to vacate a default judgment, that discretion is limited
by three important considerations. First, Rule 60(b) is
remedial in nature and therefore must be liberally applied
Second, default judgments are generally disfavored;
whenever it is reasonably possible, cases should be decided
on their merits. Third, and as a consequence of the first two
considerations, "where timely relief is sought from a default
judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if
any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the
judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits."
Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added) (cited by the Court in Lund at ^ 10).
Because of these strong equitable considerations, Utah case law is replete with
entreaties to lower courts to exercise their discretion liberally in granting relief from
default judgments.
[Discretion should be exercised in furtherance of justice and
should incline towards granting relief in a doubtful case to the
end that the party may have a hearing.
Lund at H 10 (citing Helgesen v. Inyangimia, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981))
(emphasis added).
[T]he court is anxious to protect the losing party who has not
had the opportunity to present his claim or defense.
Discretion must be exercised in furtherance of justice and the
court will incline toward granting relief in a doubtful case to
the end that the party may have a hearing.
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 420, 260 P.2d 741, 743 (1953) (emphasis
added).
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It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and
to move calendars with expedition in order to keep them up to
date. But it is even more important to keep in mind that the
very reason for the existence of courts is to afford disputants
an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them. In
conformity with that principle the courts generally tend to
favor granting relief from default judgments where there is
any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party.
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879
(Utah 1975) (emphasis added).
Given these vital policy interests, "it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of
discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or
excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set it
aside."

Lund, at ^ 11 (quoting Helgesen, 636 P.2d at 1081; May hew v. Standard

Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 54, 376 P.2d 951, 952 (1962)) (emphasis added). To that
end, the Lund court pointedly noted that "while we review the trial court's decision in the
instant case for abuse of discretion, we emphasize that the court's discretion is not
unlimited." Lund at ^j 11 (emphasis added).
B.

River Crossings Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment Met All of
the Requirements of Rule 60(b).

River Crossings' motion demonstrated more than reasonable justification for its
failure to file a responsive pleading in this case, was timely filed, and presented
meritorious defenses. The district court therefore abused its discretion in refusing to set
aside the default judgment entered against River Crossings.

611 -367470v3
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i.

Reasonable Justification or Excuse.

In Lund, the Utah Supreme Court held that a "good faith, legitimate belief that no
action would or could be taken . . . constitutes a 'reasonable justification or excuse' for
the failure to reply." Lund at ^ 19. Under Rule 60(b), movants need not "show that their
interpretation of [the] law is legally correct, but merely that they possessed a reasonable
good faith belief in their interpretation. Id. at ^ 16.
Such was precisely the case at hand. Based on Mr. Utley's express representations
that he would not initiate default proceedings against River Crossings without first
notifying opposing counsel, River Crossings reasonably and justifiably believed that no
action would be taken against it without such notice. (R. at 96-97.) Furthermore, as set
forth in detail above, had Arbogast complied with the requirements of URCP Rule 5(a),
no such action could have been taken against River Crossings without notice. As also set
forth above, Mr. Utley's June 29 Letter did not communicate notice of his intent to file
for default against River Crossings and did not satisfy the demands of Rule 5(a).
Compounding River Crossings' reasonable, good faith belief that no adverse
action could or would be taken against it was a multiplicity of factors, which collectively
resulted in River Crossings' failure to file a response. The attorney for River Crossings
who had been responsible for negotiating and communication with opposing counsel was
discharged, and the attorney who assumed those responsibilities went on an extended
vacation—all at the very moment that Mr. Utley sent his June 29 letter. (R. at 59, 96.)
Furthermore, throughout this timeframe, River Crossings' attorneys believed that
settlement negotiations were ongoing. (R. at 59.) Just six days before Mr. Utley drafted
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his June 29 Letter, River Crossings sent an email to Arbogast, requesting another
settlement conference. (R. at 59, 102.) The district court entirely omitted this fact from
its Findings.
These circumstances combined to create a "perfect storm" of sorts, leading to the
unfortunate series of events that culminated in an unwarranted default judgment against
River Crossings. This is precisely the type of good faith, reasonable justification that the
Lund court concluded fell well within the reach of Rule 60(b).
ii.

Timely.

River Crossings' motion to set aside the default judgment was timely filed. There
is no dispute as to this point.
iii.

Meritorious Defenses.

River Crossings' motion to set aside the default judgment presented meritorious
defenses. River Crossings need not actually prove its proposed defenses at this stage but
merely show a meritorious defense so as to prevent the necessity of judicial review of
questions which, on the face of the pleadings, are frivolous.

Lund at ^ 28. River

Crossings has plainly done so. River Crossings alleged in its motion that its payment
was not late because Arbogast had granted River Crossings an extension of time to make
the final payment and that Arbogast waived any Late Payment Penalty by agreeing to an
extension for the final payment. (R. at 56.) River Crossings also alleged that the Late
Payment Penalty was unconscionable. Id. These allegations and defenses, if proven,
would be a complete defense to Arbogast's claims against it. At the very least, they are
certainly not frivolous.

611 367470v3
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Because River Crossings' motion met all of the requirements of Rule 60(b), the
district court abused its discretion in failing to set aside the default judgment. This Court
should therefore reverse the ruling of the district court and sel aside the default judgment.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT WAS BASED ON FAULTY FINDINGS OF FACT.
A.

Standard of Review.

A court's refusal to set aside a default judgment based on faulty findings of fact
constitutes an abuse of discretion and cannot stand.
As a threshold matter, a court's ruling must be "based on
adequate findings of fact" and "on the law."
Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75 U 9, 11 P.3d 277. This Court will reverse findings of fact
that the marshaled evidence demonstrates are clearly erroneous. Bingham Consolidation
Co. v. Groesbeck. 2004 UT App 434, If 14, 105 P.3d 365, 370.
B.

The District Court's Finding That There Were No Communications
Between the Parties From June 29 to August 18 was Clearly
Erroneous.

In its Findings of Fact, the district court confusingly stated that, aside from a June
29 letter from Plaintiffs counsel to Defendant's counsel, "[tjhere were not any other
discussions between Plaintiffs counsel and Defendant's counsel between the June the
[sic] June 29, 2006 and August 18, 2006." (R. at 117 ^ 20, 22.) In fact, River Crossings
contacted Arbogast during this time period in an attempt to continue settlement
negotiations. Specifically, on July 25, 2006, Mike Chernine, Managing Member of River
Crossings, sent an e-mail to Arbogast, requesting another settlement negotiation
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conference to discuss the ongoing dispute. (R. at 59, 102.) Arbogast never denied this.2
Therefore, although the district court's finding is perhaps technically correct as it relates
solely to counsel of record, by omitting any reference to the July 25 e-mail, the court's
findings misleadingly suggest that there were no further attempts at settlement during this
time period. The fact that there were further communications between the parties during
this time period is critical as it pertains to River Crossings understanding that settlement
negotiations were continuing and that Arbogast would not file for default without first
notifying River Crossings.

The district court's finding is therefore misleading,

inaccurate, and clearly erroneous.
C.

The District Court's Finding That Arbogast "Required" River
Crossings to File a Responsive Pleading was Clearly Erroneous.

In its Findings of Fact, the district court stated as follows:
That on or about June 29, 2006, Plaintiffs counsel sent a
letter ("June 29, 2006 letter") via facsimile transmission to
Defendant's counsel, addressed to Tisha Black-Chernine and
to Josh Corelli, informing both of them that Plaintiff had
rejected the oral settlement offer and was requiring
Defendant to file an answer to the complaint within twenty
(20) days.
(R. at 117 ^J 20) (emphasis added). In reality, the June 29 letter merely stated as follows:
My client has previously granted your client an extension of
time within which to answer the complaint. However, given
the present state of the case, I am, on behalf of my client,
hereby requesting that your client file an Answer to the
complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter.

2

Although Arbogast moved to have this evidence excluded at the hearing on River
Crossings' Motion for Relief, River Crossings had no opportunity to brief the issue and
the district court never ruled on the issue. (R. at 185, at 3-4).
611 :367470v3
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(R. at 91) (emphasis added).
In light of Mr. Utley's prior representations that he would not pursue default
judgment without first notifying opposing counsel, the district court's use of the word
"requiring" is an inaccurate characterization of the June 29, 2006 Letter. It suggests an
ultimatum where none was given.

When read in the context of Mr. Utley's

representations, the letter "requesting" that a responsive pleading be filed does not
convey a sense of urgency or a threat of default. Mr. Utley communicated a request that
counsel file a responsive pleading, but did not "require" such action accompanied by a
notice or threat of default. The district court's use of the word "requiring" in its finding
is therefore misleading, inaccurate, and clearly erroneous.
The district court's refusal to set aside the default judgment was premised in part
on faulty findings of fact. The district court's refusal therefore constituted an abuse of
discretion and must be reversed by this Court.
CONCLUSION
Despite the requirements of Rule 5(a) and the express representations of opposing
counsel, River Crossings did not receive notice from Arbogast of its initiation of default
proceedings until default judgment had already been entered.

River Crossings was

reasonably justified in failing to defend itself based on its good faith belief that no action
could or would be taken against it without notice. For these reasons, the district court
abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment against River Crossings.
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;

DATED this '__ day of October, 2007.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &
MCCARTHY

Scott M. Lilja
Nicole M. Deforge
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this yjy

day of October, 2007, I caused to be mailed,

first-class, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT, to:
Chad J. Utley
Tyler T. Todd
Farris & Utley, PC
189 North Main Street
P.O. Box 2408
St. George, UT 84771-2408
0SlA^
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE CTFUTAH
ARBOGAST FAMILY TRUST, by and
through RODNEY J. ARBOGAST as
TRUSTEE,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROM JUDGMENT AND ORDERS

Plaintiff,
V.

RIVERCROSSINGS, LLC, a Nevada Limited
Liability Company,

Civil No. 060500096
Judge Eric A. Ludlbw

Defendants.

On February 21, 2007, this matter came before the Court for hearing on the Motion for
Relief from Judgment and Orders submitted by Defendant River Crossings, LLC. Defendant's
Managing Member, Michael Chernine was present along with represented counsel of record,
Jeffrey C. Wil cox, of the law firm of Gallian, Wilcox, Welker & Olson, L.C. Plaintiff, Rodney J.
Arbogast, as Trustee of the Arbogast Family Trust, was present along with represented counsel of
record, Chad J. Utley, of the law firm of Farris & Utley, PC. This Court, having reviewed all
pleadings of record and considered the oral arguments of counsel, hereby FINDS and ORDERS
as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1

1.

That the Arbogast Family Trust (hereinafter "Plaintiff) provided River Crossings, LLC
(hereinafter "Defendant") with a loan in the amount of two million four hundred fifty
thousand dollars ($2,450,000.00) (hereinafter "loan").

2.

That the loan was secured by a Trust Deed Note dated September 16, 2004.

3.

That pursuant to express terms of the Trust Deed Note, any remaining unpaid balance,
along with accrued interest, was due and payable on September 16, 2005 (hereinafter
"maturity date").

4.

That the Trust Deed Note provided a schedule of payments as follows: The sum of
eighteen thousand three hundred seventy-five dollars ($18,375.00) monthly, interest only,
beginning on October 16, 2004, and a like sum of eighteen thousand three hundred
seventy-five dollars ($18,375.00) monthly on the 16th day of each and every month
thereafter until the 16th day of September, 2005.

5.

After the 16lh of September, 2005, the entire remaining unpaid balance, together with
interest accrued thereon, (hereinafter "final payment") was to become immediately due
and payable. {See copy of Trust Deed Note attached as Exhibit UA" to Defendant's
Memorandum In Opposition to Motion).

6.

That on or about the 16th of September, 2005, when the remaining unpaid principal
balance, together with interest accrued thereon, became due and payable, Defendant was
unable and/or failed to tender the final payment.

7.

Defendant paid the final payment to Plaintiff on October 7, 2005, twenty-one (21) days
later.

2

That the Trust Deed Note signed on September 16. 2004, expressly provided by its terms
a penalty for late payment (hereinafter 'late payment penalty") as follows:
A late payment penalty of six percent (6%) if any payments shall
be assessed against the maker if said payment has not been
received by Holder [Plaintiff] within five (5) days of the due date.
Each payment shall be credited first to any late payments due, then
to accrued interest due and the remainder to principal. Any such
installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum until paid.
(See copy of Trust Deed Note attached to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition as
Exhibit "A".)
That Defendant disputed and refused to pay the late payment penalty.
That on or about October 6, 2005 and as a result of Defendant's dispute over the late
payment penalty, Defendant authorized Southern Utah Title Company to withhold one
hundred seventy-eight thousand five hundred thirty-nine dollars ($178,539.31)
(hereinafter "escrowed funds") and to hold said amount in escrow pending the resolution
of the dispute. (See copy of Escrow Instruction/Holdback Agreement attached as Exhibit
"B" to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition.)
That the Escrow Instruction/Holdback Agreement provided, in part, that the title company
would disburse the funds in accordance with the parties' agreement, or if no agreement,
then in accordance with a court order. Id.
That Plaintiff and Defendant attempted to reach and agreement concerning the
interpretation of the late payment penalty, but the parties were unable to come to an
agreement. Subsequently, on January 10, 2006, Plaintiff filed its complaint which
initiated the instant case for declaratory judgment.

3

That on or about December 20, 2005, Plaintiffs counsel received a letter from Josh
Corelli, on behalf of Tisha Black-Chernine. informing Plaintiff that Defendant had
retained the legal services of Black, Lobello & Pitegoff (See copy of Josh Corelli Letter
attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition as "Exhibit C;" see also Affidavit of
ChadJ.Utleyat^4).
That Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendant. However, despite diligent efforts to locate
and serve Defendant, Plaintiff was unable to effectuate service. Thereafter, Plaintiff
sought and obtained an Order of Alternative Service which granted Plaintiff permission to
serve Defendant's counsel.
That on April 4, 2006, Plaintiff served Defendant's counsel, Tisha Black-Chernine, at the
firm of Black, Lobello and Pitegoff
That Plaintiffs counsel granted Defendant's Nevada counsel, Aileen E. Cohen of Black,
Lobello & Pitegoff, two (2) separate extensions of time in which to respond to Plaintiffs
complaint for for the purpose of engaging in settlement negotiations and/or to seek Utah
counsel. (See copy of Aileen E. Cohen Letters attached as "Exhibit D" to Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition.)
That on June 14, 2006 the second (2nd) of the two (2) time extensions granted through
Plaintiffs counsel to Defendant's counsel expired. (See letter from Ms. Cohen attached
as "Exhibit D" of Plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition; see also, 1)7 of Affidavit of
Chad J. Utley attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition).
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18.

That sometime between June 14, 2006, and June 28. 2006, Mr. Utley had contact with
Defendant's counsel, Tisha Black-Chernine. and also with Josh Corelli, both of the law
firm of Black, LoBello & Sparks. (See Affidavit of Chad J. Utley).

19.

That on or about June 28, 2006, Josh Corelli offered sum certain as settlement via the
telephone to Mr. Utley. (See Affidavit of Chad J. Utley attached to Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition).

20.

That on or about June 29, 2006, Plaintiffs counsel sent a letter ("June 29, 2006 letter")
via facsimile transmission to Defendant's counsel, addressed to Tisha Black-Chernine
and to Josh Corelli, informing both of them that Plaintiff had rejected the oral settlement
offer and was requiring Defendant to file an answer to the complaint within twenty (20)
days. (See Letter from Chad J. Utley dated June 29, 2006, attached to Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition as Exhibit wtE.")

21.

There were no other extensions were granted to Defendant to answer Plaintiffs complaint
after Plaintiff, through counsel, sent the June 29, 2006 letter.

22.

There were not any other discussions between Plaintiffs counsel and Defendant's
counsel between the June 29, 2006 and August 18, 2006.

23.

Pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter, an answer was to be filed within twenty (20) days of
June 29, 2006.

24.

That Plaintiffs counsel waited approximately thirty-two (32) calendar days, prior to
Plaintiffs filing the Default Notice of Default with this Court.
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25

That on July 31. 2006. Plaintiff filed of record in this matter a Certificate of Default due
to Defendant's failure to answer Plaintiffs complaint which was served on April 4, 2006;
approximately four (4) months after service of the complaint upon Defendant.

26.

That on August 11, 2006, a default judgment was entered of record in favor of Plaintiff
against Defendant.

27.

That on August 17, 2006, Notice of Entry of Default Judgment was filed with the Court
and was sent by Plaintiff the Defendant.

28.

That Plaintiff did not receive any communication from Defendant from the time of the
June 28, 2006 teleconference until an August 18, 2006 telephone call from Defendant's
counsel, Tisha Black-Chernine to Plaintiffs counsel.

29.

That pursuant to URCP Rule 5(a)(2), Defendant's counsel has not formally appeared in
the instant action. Nevertheless, Defendant's counsel's notification and communications
with Plaintiffs counsel constitute an appearance and there was adequate notice was given
to Defendant, pursuant to the June 29, 2006 letter, that an answer was required to be filed
in response to Plaintiffs complaint.

30.

That the contention that Defendant's counsel expected notice prior to the default entry is
unfounded given the express provisions of the June 29, 2006 letter.

31.

That there was, on the part of the Defendant, a failure to exercise due diligence by failing
to follow up or otherwise communicate with Plaintiffs counsel after receiving the June
29, 2006 letter and by failing to file an answer after having been requested to do so after
Plaintiff provided Defendant with written notice that the time for extensions had
concluded and that the settlement offer had been rejected.
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32 That the lack of due diligence resulted in Defendant's failure to respond to Plaintiffs
complaint within the allotted time.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Court has broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside the default judgment.
Relief under Rule 60(b) is remedial in nature and as such this Court's discretion is limited and
has to be set within the confines of existing case law. In accordance with Utah law and the Facts
set forth above, this Court concludes that Defendant's actions and inactions in this matter do not
rise to the level of excusable neglect, inadvertence, surprise or mistake.
Defendant's counsel's purported reliance upon Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure is not
reasonable and does not constitute excusable neglect. This Court relies, in part, upon the case of
Mini Spas, Inc. V. Industrial Commission, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) for the premise that
excusable neglect is the exercise of due diligence by a reasonable and prudent person under
similar circumstances.
It would have been minimally prudent on the part of the Defendant to have taken steps
necessary to investigate their client's claim in the State of Utah, to become familiar with Utah
law and/or to consult a Utah counsel in order to protect Defendant's interest, rather than rely
upon the belief that Utah's Rules of Civil Procedures were identical to the Rules of Civil
Procedure enacted by the State of Nevada. Defendant has therefore failed to demonstrate that
Defendant used sufficient due diligence in trying to respond to Plaintiffs complaint or to address
Plaintiffs June 29, 2006 letter. Defendant simply was not prevented from either answering the
7

complaint or from responding to the June 29. 2006 letter by circumstances over which Defendant
did not have any control. (See, e.g., Black's Title, Inc , v. State Ins. Dep't, 991 P.2d 607 (Utah
Ct. App. 1999) andAirkemJntermounlain, lnc v Parker, 513 P.2d 429 (Utah 1973)).
Defendant has argued that the discharge of Defendant's counsel Aileen Cohen resulted in
ensuing confusion that lead to excusable neglect. However, it the ultimate discussions
surrounding the settlement offer and the June 29, 2006 letter were not addressed to Ms. Cohen,
the departing attorney, but to Ms. Tisha Black-Chernine and Mr. Josh Correlli, the individuals
with whom Plaintiffs counsel had been discussing the most recent settlement offer. Based upon
the foregoing facts, Defendant's excuses for its failure to answer Plaintiffs complaint do not
constitute excusable neglect, inadvertent surprise or mistake on behalf of Defendant or that
Defendant's counsel's actions and inactions rise to the level under which would allow relief to be
granted under URCP 60(b).
The facts, allegations and circumstances argued by the Defendant to set aside the
judgment are properly categorized under URCP 60(b)(1), involving "mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect," and not under URCP 60(b)(6). In Black's Title, Inc., 991 P.2d at
612, the Utah Appellate Court found that "subsection (6) may not be employed for relief when
the grounds asserted are encompassed within subsection (1)." The allegations and facts argued
by Defendant are encompassed within subsection 1 of URCP 60(b) and are, therefore, not
considered under subsection (6).
The Court concludes that Plaintiff rightfully could interpret Defendant's inaction in the
instant matter to be Defendant's acquiescence to the allegations contained in Plaintiffs
complaint. Defendant was given adequate notice to file an answer, but failed to do so and also
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failed to contact Plaintiffs counsel to either seek an additional extension or for clarification of
the June 29, 2006 letter. Therefore, based upon the foregoing facts, Defendant's Motion to Set
Aside the Default Judgment should be denied.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, after consideration of the arguments of the parties, the pleadings filed by
the parties and the documents on file with the Court, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

That Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment is hereby denied; and,

2.

The Default Judgment entered of record in this matter on August 11, 2006 remains in full
force and effect.
DATED this

|Vj/

day of April, 2007.

BY THE COURT:

Honorable Eric A. Ludlow
District Court Judge
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